Edge years to avoid—and the years we refuse to over-rank

The official record describes a potential fatal consequence.

“Desiccated Air Bag Inflator Rupture From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.”

The official record describes a potential crash, fire, injury, or loss-of-control consequence.

“Ford Motor Company (Ford) is recalling certain 2017-2018 Ford Edge and 2017 Lincoln MKZ vehicles. On vehicles with 2.0L gas engines and six-speed automatic transmissions, the torque converter weld studs may have been inadequately welded. If the torque converter weld studs fail, the torque converter will not be connected to the engine flexplate and the vehicle will lose the ability to move, increasing the risk of a crash. Ford will notify owners, and dealers will replace the torque converters, free of charge. The recall began on July 5, 2018. Owners may contact Ford customer service at 1-866-436-7332. Ford's number for this recall is 17S16 (S2). Note: This recall is an expansion of recall 17V-427.”

The official record describes a potential crash, fire, injury, or loss-of-control consequence.

“Ford Motor Company (Ford) is recalling certain 2019 Edge vehicles. The driver-side seat belt pretensioner anchor may have been improperly crimped, possibly resulting in the seat belt webbing detaching from the anchor in the event of a crash. In the event of a crash, seat belt webbing that detaches from the anchor will not properly restrain the driver, increasing their risk of injury. Ford has notified owners, and dealers will inspect and, if necessary, replace the driver's side pretensioner assembly, free of charge. The recall began November 12, 2019. Owners may contact Ford customer service at 1-866-436-7332. Ford's number for this recall is 19S37.”

The official record identifies a condition that deserves candidate-specific inspection and record verification.

“Rearview Camera FMVSS 111 Noncompliance On September 23, 2020, Ford Motor Company (Ford) filed a noncompliance recall report under 49 CFR Part 573 (NHTSA Recall No. 20V-575), recalling 620,246 Model Year (MY) 2020 Ford F-150, F-250, F-350, F-450, F-550, Explorer, Mustang, Transit, Expedition, Escape, Ranger and Edge, and Lincoln Nautilus and Corsair vehicles for a noncompliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 111, Rear Visibility. Ford's recall described the noncompliance as insufficient electrical conductivity within the printed circuit board (PCB) internal to the camera leading to intermittent rearview camera operation. The supplier of the cameras was Magna Electronics.According to Ford's chronology in the Part 573, during the period February-April 2020, Ford identified and monitored warranty claims pertaining to intermittent or inoperative rearview cameras. Ford reviewed supplier product changes, focusing on changes introduced by the supplier in the October-November 2019 time frame. The Part 573 stated that the issue was brought to Ford's Critical Concerns Review Group (CCRG) for review on May 12, 2020.On July 7, 2020, NHTSA's Vehicle Research and Testing Center (VRTC) informed the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) of a trend of MY 2020 Escape vehicles with rearview camera malfunctions. ODI contacted Ford the next day, providing five Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) alleging inoperative rearview cameras. On July 15, 2020, Ford met with NHTSA to discuss the rearview camera issue. In a subsequent August 24, 2020 meeting, ODI and NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC) met with Ford to discuss the recall status and additional VOQs. Ford presented rate and scope data for many of its MY 2020 products during the August 2020 meeting indicating high failure rates for certain models.This RQ is being opened to investigate both the timeliness and scope of Ford's rearview camera recall (20V-575), and Ford's compliance with reporting requirements.The subject reports referenced in the opening resume are identified by the following ODI reference numbers which can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov: 11349813, 11344126, 11342696, 11341486, 11340254, 11337274, 11331444, 11330875, 11329235, 11316960, 11343521, 11341884, 11337226, 11344018, and 11339573.”

The official record identifies a condition that deserves candidate-specific inspection and record verification.

“Loss of Motive Power On July 22, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) granted a Defect Petition (DP22001) and opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE22007) to investigate allegations of loss of motive power in model year (MY) 2021 Ford Bronco vehicles equipped with 2.7L EcoBoost engines. Complainants were reporting sudden engine failure while driving resulting in a loss of motive power, often without the ability to restart. During PE22007, the cause of engine failure and loss of motive power in the subject vehicles was determined to be intake valve fracture, and the full scope of vehicles affected by the subject defect was identified as all MY 2021-2022 Ford and Lincoln models equipped with either the 2.7L or 3.0L EcoBoost engines, referred to as the “Nano” engine family.  If an intake valve fractures in the subject engines, it may drop into the cylinder and contact the piston, often resulting in catastrophic engine damage. On September 29, 2023, PE22007 was upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA23002) to further investigate the subject defect across the full scope of affected vehicles. During EA23002, ODI visited Ford facilities to review technical information related to intake valve fracture in “Nano” engines, coordinated with NHTSA’s Vehicle Research and Testing Center (VRTC), and analyzed updated field data relating the subject defect. Forensic analysis of fractured intake valves demonstrated that the defective components exhibited “grinding burn” or out of specification hardness in the area of the keeper grooves. The presence of grinding burn is evidence that during the groove grinding phase of production, the temperature of the valve became sufficiently high to alter the microstructure of the material and is indicative that the valve supplier’s manufacturing processes were not within control specifications. Grinding burn results in a hard, brittle microstructure and high residual stresses toward the surface of the valve. Through normal engine loading, a valve with grinding burn will likely fracture at the area of highest vulnerability, which is the third keeper groove. In its response to the EA23002 Information Request (IR) letter, Ford provided evidence of 396 customer complaints (including field reports), 825 warranty claims, and 936 engine exchanges. When considering both ODI and manufacturer failure report data, there have been reports representing 1066 unique vehicles within the subject vehicle population. Analysis of the failure report data demonstrates that vehicles equipped with potentially defective intake valves were built within a production “spike period” of May 2021 – October 2021. The beginning of the spike period corresponds to a ramp up in production at the valve supplier manufacturing facility, and the end of the spike period aligns with the implementation of several mid-production process improvements and the decision to change the metal alloy used to produce intake valves from “Silchrome Lite” to “Silchrome 1”. Ford began investigating the subject defect in July 2021, determined the root cause, and took corrective measures for the new production vehicles. Analysis of the failure report data demonstrates that these corrective actions were successful in eliminating the risk of intake valve fracture for subject vehicles produced after October 2021. However, Ford did not take any field action to address vehicles produced during the spike period, and in the several months following the implementation of the production changes, a significant number of field failures continued to occur. It is Ford’s assessment that not all valves produced during the spike period are defective, and that failures associated with the subject defect occur at low time in service. Analysis of the failure report data demonstrates that the vast majority of failures have occurred before 20,000 miles with over half of all reported failures occurring before 5,000 miles. The rate of reported failures related to the subject defect has steadily decreased since November 2021. ODI coordinated with NHTSA’s National Center for Statistics and Analysis (NCSA) to conduct statistical analysis and predict the number of future failures associated with the subject defect. The results of this analysis, and the trends identified through the failure report data are generally consistent with Ford’s assessment that defective intake valves will likely fail at a low time in service and indicate that the majority of subject vehicles equipped with defective valves have already experienced a failure. On August 23, 2024, Ford submitted recall 24V635 for subject vehicles equipped with “Nano” engines and built within the production spike period identified above (total population 90,736 vehicles). The remedy includes an inspection at a Ford/Lincoln dealership where the lifetime engine cycles of the vehicle will be determined. If a vehicle does not meet a threshold for lifetime engine cycles, the dealership will conduct a high RPM engine cycle accumulation procedure, which aims to identify if the vehicle is equipped with defective intake valves. Any vehicle that fails the accumulation procedure will receive an engine replacement under the recall. In addition to recall 24V635, Ford has stated that it will launch customer satisfaction campaign 24N12, which will provide extended warranty coverage to the subject vehicles through the earlier of 10 years or 150,000 miles. In view of the recall action being taken by Ford, ODI is closing this Engineering Analysis. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.”

The official record identifies a condition that deserves candidate-specific inspection and record verification.

“Loss of Motive Power On July 22, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) granted a Defect Petition (DP22001) and opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE22007) to investigate allegations of loss of motive power in model year (MY) 2021 Ford Bronco vehicles equipped with 2.7L EcoBoost engines. Complainants were reporting sudden engine failure while driving resulting in a loss of motive power, often without the ability to restart. During PE22007, the cause of engine failure and loss of motive power in the subject vehicles was determined to be intake valve fracture, and the full scope of vehicles affected by the subject defect was identified as all MY 2021-2022 Ford and Lincoln models equipped with either the 2.7L or 3.0L EcoBoost engines, referred to as the “Nano” engine family.  If an intake valve fractures in the subject engines, it may drop into the cylinder and contact the piston, often resulting in catastrophic engine damage. On September 29, 2023, PE22007 was upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA23002) to further investigate the subject defect across the full scope of affected vehicles. During EA23002, ODI visited Ford facilities to review technical information related to intake valve fracture in “Nano” engines, coordinated with NHTSA’s Vehicle Research and Testing Center (VRTC), and analyzed updated field data relating the subject defect. Forensic analysis of fractured intake valves demonstrated that the defective components exhibited “grinding burn” or out of specification hardness in the area of the keeper grooves. The presence of grinding burn is evidence that during the groove grinding phase of production, the temperature of the valve became sufficiently high to alter the microstructure of the material and is indicative that the valve supplier’s manufacturing processes were not within control specifications. Grinding burn results in a hard, brittle microstructure and high residual stresses toward the surface of the valve. Through normal engine loading, a valve with grinding burn will likely fracture at the area of highest vulnerability, which is the third keeper groove. In its response to the EA23002 Information Request (IR) letter, Ford provided evidence of 396 customer complaints (including field reports), 825 warranty claims, and 936 engine exchanges. When considering both ODI and manufacturer failure report data, there have been reports representing 1066 unique vehicles within the subject vehicle population. Analysis of the failure report data demonstrates that vehicles equipped with potentially defective intake valves were built within a production “spike period” of May 2021 – October 2021. The beginning of the spike period corresponds to a ramp up in production at the valve supplier manufacturing facility, and the end of the spike period aligns with the implementation of several mid-production process improvements and the decision to change the metal alloy used to produce intake valves from “Silchrome Lite” to “Silchrome 1”. Ford began investigating the subject defect in July 2021, determined the root cause, and took corrective measures for the new production vehicles. Analysis of the failure report data demonstrates that these corrective actions were successful in eliminating the risk of intake valve fracture for subject vehicles produced after October 2021. However, Ford did not take any field action to address vehicles produced during the spike period, and in the several months following the implementation of the production changes, a significant number of field failures continued to occur. It is Ford’s assessment that not all valves produced during the spike period are defective, and that failures associated with the subject defect occur at low time in service. Analysis of the failure report data demonstrates that the vast majority of failures have occurred before 20,000 miles with over half of all reported failures occurring before 5,000 miles. The rate of reported failures related to the subject defect has steadily decreased since November 2021. ODI coordinated with NHTSA’s National Center for Statistics and Analysis (NCSA) to conduct statistical analysis and predict the number of future failures associated with the subject defect. The results of this analysis, and the trends identified through the failure report data are generally consistent with Ford’s assessment that defective intake valves will likely fail at a low time in service and indicate that the majority of subject vehicles equipped with defective valves have already experienced a failure. On August 23, 2024, Ford submitted recall 24V635 for subject vehicles equipped with “Nano” engines and built within the production spike period identified above (total population 90,736 vehicles). The remedy includes an inspection at a Ford/Lincoln dealership where the lifetime engine cycles of the vehicle will be determined. If a vehicle does not meet a threshold for lifetime engine cycles, the dealership will conduct a high RPM engine cycle accumulation procedure, which aims to identify if the vehicle is equipped with defective intake valves. Any vehicle that fails the accumulation procedure will receive an engine replacement under the recall. In addition to recall 24V635, Ford has stated that it will launch customer satisfaction campaign 24N12, which will provide extended warranty coverage to the subject vehicles through the earlier of 10 years or 150,000 miles. In view of the recall action being taken by Ford, ODI is closing this Engineering Analysis. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.”