2016 Jeep Patriot: Complaints, Recalls & Known Issues

On December 13, 2016, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) received recall 16V-907 from Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) that identified a safety defect involving crankshaft or camshaft sensor failures on certain 2016 Model Year Dodge Journey, Jeep Compass, and Jeep Patriot vehicles. The failure of the crankshaft or camshaft sensor may lead to a loss of motive power (LOMP) in the recalled vehicles.  Following the receipt of recall 16V-907, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received 127 vehicle owner’s questionnaires (VOQ), in which consumers allege experiencing crankshaft or camshaft failures on similar vehicles not included in the recall.  On July 22, 2022, this Recall Query was opened to further assess the scope, frequency, and safety consequences of the alleged defect described in the recall. During this investigation, ODI sent two information request (IR) letters to FCA.  The first letter was sent on August 15, 2022, and the second on July 12, 2024.  Responses to these IR letters, that included manufacturer claim data related to the alleged defect, were received on September 26, 2022, and September 6, 2024, respectively. Analysis of ODI and FCA claim data identified two failure modes relating to intermittent crankshaft and camshaft sensor loss of signal.  The first failure mode involves a faulty crankshaft or camshaft electrical connector, as identified in recall 16V-907. The second failure mode involves a faulty crankshaft and/or camshaft position sensor.  Both failure modes exhibit intermittent operation of the crankshaft and/or camshaft position sensor that can result in a malfunction indicator lamp (MIL), engine stall while driving, or a no start condition. For the first failure mode, the claim data indicates that the majority of failures resulted in a LOMP and occurred on vehicles covered by recall 16V-907. For the second failure mode, the claim data indicates that the majority of failures resulted in a MIL or no start condition and occurred on vehicles manufactured prior to the vehicles covered by recall 16V-907. VOQ and claim data submitted to NHTSA, involving vehicles built outside the scope of recall 16V-907, commonly do not describe a LOMP.  These claims typically describe experiencing symptoms such as a MIL, Diagnostic Trouble Code (DTC) associated with crank/camshaft position sensor, and subsequent visits to a dealership. A substantially smaller percentage of the complaints allege an actual LOMP ( During production, FCA implemented multiple corrective actions to address the camshaft/camshaft sensor signal issue. The last of which was a software update that occurred in February 2016 and based on the claim data, addressed the crankshaft and/or camshaft position sensor issues that were leading to MIL or no start.  For vehicles built prior to the software update, the sensor failures were normally covered under warranty. FCA’s assessment of the alleged defect is that the subject vehicles (not included in recall 16V-907) are not typically experiencing a LOMP when they have trouble with their crankshaft and/or camshaft position sensor and for that reason it does not represent a safety defect.  FCA states consumers experience multiple warning signs including MIL illumination, drive quality changes, or no start conditions when a crankshaft and/or camshaft position sensor is failing. Based on ODI's analysis of the failure modes, the failure mode for vehicles not included in recall 16V-907 is unlikely to result in LOMP. The data indicates that vehicles not included in the recall experience LOMP at much lower rates than the recalled population.  In addition, ODI is not aware of any related vehicle crashes or injuries in that time.  Given these facts, a safety-related defect trend has not been identified at this time.  Accordingly, this investigation is closed without action. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE19014 on September 9, 2019, to investigate 128 consumer complaints alleging that the Active Head Rest (AHR) inadvertently deployed without the occurrence of a crash or other rear impact event in model year (MY) 2014 Jeep Grand Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles.When ODI opened the investigation, ODI was aware of thirteen alleged injuries.A small number of Early Warning Reports identified driver and/or passenger front seat AHR inadvertent deployments without a rear impact event.Reported safety consequences resulting from the AHR deployments include concussions, headaches, soft tissue injuries, disorientation, nausea, vomiting and/or loss of vehicle control as a result of being surprised and distracted by being struck in the head by the inadvertent AHR deployment. On September 24, 2019, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA).ODI requested certain detailed information from FCA related to the following subject vehicles: MY 2010-2014 Dodge Avenger 200, MY 2010-2014 Dodge Calber, MY 2010-2014 Chrysler Sebring, MY 2013-2015 Ram Tradesman, MY 2012 Ram Van, MY 2010-2019 Dodge Grand Caravan, MY 2010-2016 Chrysler Town and Country, MY 2010-2017 Jeep Compass, MY 2011-2020 Dodge Durango, MY 2011-2020 Jeep Grand Cherokee, MY 2010-2019 Dodge Journey, MY 2010-2012 Jeep Liberty, MY 2010-2011 Jeep Nitro, and MY 2010-2011 Jeep Patriot vehicles.On December 2, 2019, ODI received a response from FCA that included vehicle production data, consumer complaints, field reports, warranty claims, manufacturer actions, production changes, and other data related to the alleged defect from the start of production (2010) through September 24, 2019.On January 27, 2020, ODI received an update to the December 2, 2019, IR response from FCA.On September 22, 2020, ODI requested additional subject vehicle AHR information from FCA.ODI received FCA's response on October 21, 2020.ODI subsequently received an update to FCA's October 21, 2020, response on February 16, 2021.During the investigation, ODI requested updates to certain IR questions on two occasions.FCA provided updates to question #2 on March 5, 2021, and questions #2 and #5 on May 26, 2023. FCA’s IR response data identified approximately 7.5 million subject vehicles (with approximately 15 million AHR assemblies).Due to the large number of vehicles and failure reports, ODI focused its analysis on the FCA vehicle model with the highest failure rate to represent the worst-case scenario.For this purpose, ODI focused on MY 2012-2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee vehicles for its analysis.This population includes 710,890 vehicles that FCA manufactured between August 19, 2011, and August 8, 2015.ODI identified 2,839 alleged AHR failures within this limited population.ODI identified 263 alleged injuries that were caused by AHR failures in MY 2012-2015 Grand Cherokees vehicles.Of these alleged injuries, ODI categorized them as eighty-two (82) soft tissue (neck/whiplash, bruise) injuries, four (4) concussions, fifty-nine (59) headaches, and one hundred eighteen (118) without a specific injury description.Although complainants have alleged injuries, ODI has been unable to obtain evidence to substantiate or validate any injuries where medical treatment was required.Consumer outreach was conducted by ODI, where sixty-three (63) FCA complainants with alleged injuries were contacted.Twelve of the sixty-three FCA consumers responded and were interviewed by ODI.ODI requested medical records, however, only one response was provided. Attorneys representing the responding complainant provided a synopsis that indicated they had experienced prior neck-related injuries dating to the mid-1990s.ODI also contacted one hundred (100) consumers who submitted Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) in an attempt to validate alleged injuries. Despite the efforts of ODI, the office has been unsuccessful at obtaining substantive documentation/evidence supporting complaints that allege serious injuries (where pre-existing medical conditions did not already exist). In addition to the low severity of alleged injuries caused by AHR deployments, there have been eleven alleged crashes and two alleged lane departures within the entire subject vehicle population that has been in the field up to sixteen years (with over 8,500 AHR inadvertent deployments).ODI was not able to validate that the alleged crashes were the result of inadvertent head rest deployments, and the crashes were minor in nature. ODI has conducted a thorough investigation of the alleged safety defect and with up to sixteen years of exposure for some vehicles and over 8,500 inadvertent AHR deployments, no serious crashes or injuries could be validated in the sub-population of focus.The lack of serious injuries validated by ODI with such large period of field exposure is consistent with thework done by NHTSA’s Human Injury Research Division and the Biodynamic Research Corporation, which support that an inadvertent AHR deployment is not likely to cause serious injury.In addition to the low risk of injury, FCA released an extended warranty program that covers inadvertent AHR deployment for ten years / unlimited mileage from the vehicle's in-service date. PE19014 is closed with the FCA extended warranty program.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist, and the Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by new circumstances. To review a complete closing summary, please the attached closing report. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect.  During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications.  The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V-668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU.  In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment.  FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle.  Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW.  These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes.  An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time.   In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU.  This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners.  Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation.  The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage.  There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation.  The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU.  If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC.  Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC.  All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled.  In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V-668, 18E-043, 18V-137, 18V-363, and 20V-024.  With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.